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Swedish  stainless  steel has  played  by  the rules  - private
ownership, competitive pricing, government  support strictly
within the GA`1T rules, and the OECD guidelines.  But when
Sweden  refused  to "voluntarily"  restrict  its  exports,  it was
severely set upon through antidumping actions
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Fors argucs thai good economics, inteniational  was clearly within the bounds of the intema-
competitiveness, privatc ownership, and limited  tional understanding of what that role should be.
support from a government demonstrating good
inteniationial  citizenship are not enough to  Producers in the United States, meanwhile,
defenid  an industry against the application of  were shopping around for ways to restrict
antidumping or other import-restrictinig  policy.  imports of Swedish stainless steel products.
They actively sought protection under every
T he Swedish stainless steel industry re-  available provision of U.S. trade laws.  Efforts
sponded to the world crisis in the steel market in  under section 301 and countervailing duty laws
ihc 1  970s with major industrial restructuring.  By  failed, but their claims under section 201 resulted
wholeheartedly applying the principle of profit-  in the imposition of quotas and additional tariffs
aibility  to decisionmaking, the industry trans-  covering most stainless steel products for over
formed itself into a hcalthy, internationally  ten years.  Those under antidumping provisions
competitive industry.  Today the two remaining  resulted in the imposition of duties that are still
stainless steel  inrns  in Sweden are among the  in effect for stainless stccl plate (Avesta), welded
v.orld leaders in their fields and are the world's  tubes (Avesta-Sandvik Tube), and scamless
largest produccrs of some stainless steel prod-  tubes (Sandvik Steel). This extensive use of
ucts.  trade remedy cases against Swedish stainless
steel is not an aberration but rather an illustration
During this transformation, stainless stecl  of how the system generally works.
firms also learned to get along without govem-
ment in!:-venlion.  After 1982. the government's  On the Sandvik steel antidumping case,
policy toward the industry changed.  The govern-  Sweden complained to the GATT, which cstab-
mcnt ended all direct support to the industry in  lished an antidumping panel to investigate the
1982 and by the end of 1987 stainless steel firms  case.  The panel's recommcndation that the
had paid back all of their structural delegaition  antidumping order be lifted was based not on a
loans dating from the late 1970s. In addition, thc  consideration of the broad issue of whose
Swedish government - in complying with  position was riglht  from a rational economic or
OECD crit:nia guiding national steel policy-  business perspective, but on a procedural detail.
demiionistrated  beter  international citizenship than  Just as "dumping" is whatever a domestic
citlher  the United states or the European Commu-  industry can get its government to act against
nity.  The negativc findings of the U.S.  under antidumping law, concludes Fors, so "not
countervailing duty and seclion 301 cases against  dumping" is whatever a GATT panel cites as
Scden  offered further support that the Swedish  grounds to discredit an antidumping order.
government's  role in the stainless steel industry
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Wlth  a  populatlon  of  only  8  million  people,  Sweden  has  a  smll  domastic
market  for  lt.  production.  Swediah  lnduotrles  prospWr  by  focuolng  on  hlgh-
quallty  productB  for  the  world  market  talnleos  steel  tubes  for  nuclear
power  stations  or  stalnless  ateel  for  surgiaCl  lnetrumenta,  for  example.  Many
Sw,di8h  firma  are  among  the  world's  industrial  leaders  in  metals,  machinery,
and  electrleal  equipment.  Sweden'  highly  skilled  and  educated  managment  and
labor  force  and  an  excellent  infraotructure  have  been  important  factors
contributing  to  this  success.
Over  time,  Swedish  industries  have  defended  their  position  on  the  world
market  by  moving  on to  more  sophisticated  products.  Before  the Lndustrial
revolution  in  the  nineteenth  century,  Sweden  was the  world's  largest  iron  and
steel  producer  and exporter,  thanks  to lts abundance  of the necessary  natural
resources  - high-quality  iron  Ore,  foreats,  and  hydropower.  High-grade  iron
and  steel  became  Sweden's  flrat important  exports.  Eventually,  high-grade
steels,  such  as  stainless,  became  a  larger  part  of  the  steel  industry.  Later,
Sweden  moved  into  higher-value  stainlesf  steel  varietieo,  such  as  material  for
surical  instruments.
Stainless  steel  is  a  good  example  of  the  leading-edge  of  Swedish
industry.  Compared  with  the  stainless  steel  induotry  in  other  countries,  the
Lndustry  in  Sweden iL  charactorized  by  higher-grade  products  and  a  stronger
export  orientation.  A good  moasuro  of Swedens concentratLon  on hLgh-grade
stalnless  products  is  the export  prLce  levels  accordlng  to a report  by the
Organization for Econoamc CooperatLon and Development  (OECD 1981), Sweden had
the  highest  export  prlces  for  most  categoriLs  of stainless  steel  products
among  the  major  producing  countries.
Stainless  and  other  hLgh-grade  steels  have  played  an important  role  in
the developmnt of the  SwedLih  manufacturing  Lndustry  as well.  Many successful
Swedish  fLims  of today  had  their  origino  in  tho  old lron  and steel  fLrms,  aome
datLng  back several  hundred  years.  As the  ateol  industry  diversifLed  Lnto  more2
highly  proceed  steel  products  ln  the  nLneteenth  century,  an  advancad
manufacturing  industry  emrged,  transforming  Sweden from  an  agrarian  to  an
industrial  country.  The Swedish  englneering  industry,  which  9rged  from
various  metal-workLng  industries,  is  a  prime  example  of  this  evolutLonary
procesns  Tofay,  Lt  accounts  for  almost  half  of Swedcn'e  manufacturLng  Lnduatry
and  well  over  half  of  lts  manufactured  exports.
The impact  of  the  stainless  steel  industry  on  Sweden's  LndustrLal
development  has  been  far-reachLng,  desplte  the  relatively  mall  number of
peoplo'employed  by  the  Lndustry  --  about  9,000,  or  1.2  percent  of  the  total
SwedLsh  Lndustrial  labor  force  (Swedlah  InstLtuto  1989  and  Jornkontoret
Lnternal  report  1990).  Two prlvately  owned  firms,  Avesta  and  Sandvik  Steel,
make up  the  Swedish  stainless  steel  industry  today.  The  fLrms  are  competitive
LnternatLonally  and  are  the  world's  largest  producers  for  certain  stainless
steel  products.  Both  firm  are  strongly  export  orLented  and  have  productLon
facilities  in  several  countrLes.  government  support  to  the  Lndustry  has  been
limlted  and  within  the  bounds  of  the  international  *understanding"  on
government  Lavolvemaet  n  national  steel  iLdustries.  Stainleos  steel  fLrms
have  received  no  goverment  loans  or  credit  guarantees  since  1979  and  no
government  support  of  any  kind  ince  1984.  Yet  both  Avesta  and  Sandvik  Steel
are  currently  under  U.S.  antidumpingr  orders.
SwediLh  stainless  steel  products  have  been subject  to  extensive  U.S.
import  restrLctLons  sLnce  the  mLd-1970s,  whLch,  perhaps  not  coincLdentally,
was  also  a  pariod  of  crLeLs  for  the  steel  industry  worldwLde.  These
restrLitLons  have  taken  many form --  antidumpLng  orders,  import  quotas,
general  import  tariffs,  and  addltLonal  import  tarLffs.  They  have  not  only
restrLited  SwedLih  exports  dlrectly,  but  they  have also  done  so indirectly
through  theLr  substantLal  administrative  costs  and  theLr  general  harassment
effects  in  creatLng  a  climate  of  uncertainty  for  Swedish  stainles  steel
exports.
The  experLence  of  the  Swedish  stainless  steel  Lndustry  wLth  U.S.  trade
remedies  actLons  suggests  that  an  industry  followLng  good  economic  prineiples3
is  not  imune  to  the  forees  seeking  antLdumping  and  other  forms  of  protection
--  not  even if  that  industry  L  privately  owned,  internationally  competitive,
and  receives  very limited  sapport  from  a  government  demonstrating  good
international  citizenshLp.
This  chapter  looks  at  how  and  why  thLi  happened  and  argues  that  the
Swedish  case  is  not  an  aberration  but  rather  a  normal  example  of  the  trade
remedies  proces  at  work.  It  examines  the 0teel  crisio  of  the  1$V70  and  the
emergence  of  the  Swedich  stainlese  steel  industry  from  that  crisis  ao  a
leaner,  stronger  international  competitor.  It  looks  also  at  the  role  of  the
Swedish  government  in  the  industry's  adjustment  process  and  at  the
government's  diminishing  involvement  in  the  sector.  Finally,  it considers  the
protectionist  response  of  the  U.S.  ateel  industry  to  Swedish  import
competition,  concluding  that  antidumping  and  other  trade  remedies  cases  had
nothing  to  do  with  whether  Swedish  or  U.S.  firms  were acting  "correctly"  in
any  meaningful  economic  or  business  sense.  Rather,  these  cases  demonstrate
that  "dumping"  hao  been  operationally  defined  as  whatever  actions  the  domestic
industry  can  get  the  government  to  act  against  under  antidumping  law.
The stool  crisais
The  steel  crisis  began  in  1975,  with  a  drastic  fall  in world  steel
demtand,  and  did  not  end  untll  the  mlddle  of  the  1980s.  The  crisis  emerged
during  the  world  recession  that  followed  the  sharp  rise in oil prices  in  1974,
throwing  the  whole  world  into  a  long  period  of  slow  economic  growth.  The  steel
industry  had just  experienced  two  years  of  booming  growth  in  1973  and  1974  and
had  responded  to  optimistic  projections  for  the  future  with  high  levels  of
investment.  At the  beginning  of  the  1970s,  some  observers  had  even  predicted  a
coming  steol  shortage.  They  could  not  have  been  more  wrong.4
UaaJasldg  tho  changea  In  competitive  condlelons
The  stel  crisis  unmasked  the  change.s  i  competitLve  conditione  that  had
been taking  Iace  over a  long  period  of  rapid  growth.  Before  1975,  growth  ln
demand  and  prices  had  been so high  that  even  inefflaient  firms  were  able  to
mak  a  profit.  After 1975,  however,  there  was  a mismatch  between  demand  and
oupply  (capacity)  that  caused prices  to  fall.  IneffLeiont  firm.  were  no  longer
able  to  make  a  profit.
The increased  compettioLn  that  had  gradually  been  building  in  responue
to  important  changes  in  the  world  market  finally  became  apparent  during  the
Crisis.  The  loweriLng  of  international  trade  barriers  under  the  General
Agreement  cn  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT) and  advances  in  lower-cost  transport  had
increased  competition  in  the  market.  Now producers  had  emerged,  and  many of
them,  particularly  those  in  Japan  and  South  Korea,  had  new,  modern  plants  with
lOwer  production  coets  than  traditional  U.S.  and  European  producers.  With  a
greater  number  of producers  willing  and  able  to  bid  On  steel  contracts,  prices
were forced  downward.
Thum for  older  firms,  the roturn  to  profitability  wao  a  much more
cesplicated  matter  than simply  waiting  for  world  demand  to  pick  up  or
modernizing  old-fashioned  plants.  The  Swedish  stainlese  oteel  industry  was
strongly  affected  by  these  changes  in  competitive  condltions.  In  addition,  the
Swedish  industry  had  two  other  factoro  to  contend  withs its  labor  coste  had
increased  relative  to  costs  in  the  reot  of  the  world,  and  economies  of  scale
in otainlese  steel  production  had  increased,  which  put  Swedish  firms,  with
their  small  plant  size,  at  a  competitive  disadvantage.
Fall  Ia  demand
In  1975,  demand  for  steel  changed  in  two  ways:  the  level  of  demand
dropped  dramatically  --  world  coneumption  fell  by  10  percent  from  its  1974
level --  and growth  in demand  (as steelmakers would  eventually realize)  had
virtually  dioappeared.  It  would  take  10 years,  until  1984,  for  world  demand  to
recover  from  that  10  percent  drop  in 1975  (Z4Beserlin  1987),5
From  1945  to  1974,  world  production  of  steel  grew  at  an  average  annual
rate  of  5-6  percent. 1I  Growth  rates  were  oven  higher  for  the Swedish stainless
steel  industry  in  the boom years  of  1973  and  1974  (inca  1981).  Then.a  growth  in
world  steel  production  virtually  stopped,  averaging  zero  percent  over  the
period  1975  to  the  mid-1980s,  (Fritz  1988),  and  dld  not  pick  up  again  until
the  sacond  half  of  the 19808.  The  pre-1975  growth  rates  were  never  reached
again?2  For  stainless  oteel,  annual  world  growth  during  this period  dropped
to  1-2  percent  (Inco  1981,  1990).
Sweden  was  especially  hard  hit  by  the crisis,  wlth  stalnless  steel
production  falling  by  37  percent  between  1974  and  1977,  compared  with  less
than  one  percent,  on  average,  for  the  other  major  producers  (Inoa  1981).
Employment  in  the  specialty  steel  sector  fsll  by  13  percent. 3 The  crisLi  that
began  in  1975  was  a  longer  and  deeper  cyclical  downturn  than  Sweden  had  ever
experienced  before.
Increased  capeclty
While  demand  was  falling,  capacity  was expanding,  creating  the  other
dimension  of the  crisis.  Capacity  had  expanded  rapidly  during  the  1930e,
1940.,  and  19500  to  meet  the  huge  demand  for  steel  created  by  the  war  and  by
post-war  reconstruction.  Finally,  by  the  end  of  the  1950s,  demand  and  capacity
were  ln  balance  (Pettersoon  1968).  By  the  mid-1960.,  however,  a condition  of
chronic  excess  capacity  began  to  emerge,  and  by  1975,  the  gap  widened  as
demand  fell.  The  entire  world  steel  industry  faced  a  major  utructural  problem.
By  1977,  the  SwedLsh  steel  industry  was  produclng  at  only  about  half  of its
capaclty. 4
CapacLty  in  the  SwedLih  stainless  steel  industry  continued  to  expand
even  after  1975.  One  reason  for  the  continued  expansion  was  the  long  time  lag
between  investment  decisions  and  the  completLon  of  construction  projects.  Much
of the increased  capacity  was  the  result  of  investment  decLiions  that  had been
made  before  the  economic  downturn.  In  any  ease,  producers  and  governments6
believed  that  the  cyclLeal  downturn  was only  temporary,  so investmente  were
geared  toward  a continuation  of the  high  growth  rates  of the  past.
Other  economic  forces  were  also  at  work,  pushing  fer  incroased
expanion.  Lower-grade  steel  producers  wanted  to  move  up  to  higher-grade
products  such  as  stainless  because  proflts  were  hlgher.  FLirm  were  also  eager
to  invest  in  new  equipment  because  of  the  rapid  rate  of  increase  in energy  and
labor  costs  compared  to capital  coats  durlng  the  1970o.  And  new  economies  of
scale  and  economios  arising  from  new  technologles  made  modern  productlon
equipment  more  productive  and  cost  efficLent.  Replacing  or upgrading  old
equipment  automatically  raised  capacity  without  a  corresponding  increase  in
cost  (OECD 1981).
And  f inally,  many  new  producers  of stainleas  steel  were emerging  in  the
1970s,  and  their  countries  were  becoming  lees  dependent  on  imports.  Many
developing  countries  had  built  steel  plants  as  the  "flagships"  of their
industrial  development  in  the  1950.  and  19609,  and  a  move  into  stainless  steel
was  the  next  step  on  their  path  to  industrialization.  New shipping  methods  and
depressed  shipping  prices  in  the  1970.  lowered  transportation  coats,  enabling
Japan  and  other  Asian  countries  to  become  exporters  despite  the  long  distances
to  export  markets  and  the  ned  to  import  raw  materials.
Adjustment  in the  Swedish  staiess  steel  industry
In 1982,  the stainless  steel  firms  and  the  Swedish  government  initiated
a  series  of  discussion  and  negotiatlone  directed  at  finding  a  long-term
solution  for  the  industry,  which  by  that  time  had  reached  the  most  serious
point  in  the  crisis.  The  industry  emerged  from  that  process  fully  committed  to
profitability  as the  guide  to  decisionmaking.  The  stainless  steel  firms  began
to  ask,  "Where  and  how  can  we  make  a  profit?",  instead  of "How can  we maintain
our  position  wLthin  the  industry?".  Firms  demonstrated  a  new willingness  to
cast  off  their  traditions,  to  forsake  their  historical.  product-process
identity,  and  oven  to  drop  out  of  the  stainless  steel  lndustry  if  that  made7
economic  sense.  The fimO  abandoned much of their identity as individual firms
and instead looked objectively at the Lndustrys  total production unlts in
Sweden, combining or closing them as needed to ensure profitability. Once
profitabliLty replaced tradition ast  the guLde to decisions, finding a  solution
to the criuii was possible.
Adjustment ln  the Swedish s0tainleme  steel irdusety durLng 1974=84
involved  deastic  changes,  followed  by  similar  but  loas intensive changes
thereafter  (table.  9.1  and  9.2).  A report  by  the United  Nations  deseribed  the
process in these wordl  t
The  Swedish  private  ateelmaking  sector  has  rationalized  and
restructured  its  operations  through  mergers. 0 ..  These  mergers  are
typical  of  the pattern of rationalization that has brought a
single  leading  producer  for  each  of  the  key  specialty  steel
[including  stainless  oteell  products....  In  many  respects,  Sweden
has  lei  the  way  in  restructuring  both  the  ordinary  carbon  oteel
and  the  specialty  steol  [lncluding  stalnless  steolJ sectors  in
order  to  maintain their profitability and improve  their  efficiency
in the face of intornational competition. One feature of
rationalization has been a  move towards larger  production  units  in
an economy once characterized by many  sall  steel plants (United
Natione 1989, 83).
Four trends characterized thli adjustment processa
a  Fever  docisionmakers.  In  1974,  six  firms  controlled  the industry;  by 1984,
only  two  firms  did  (table  9.1).
* Fewer production lines. The total Swedish output of each stainless steel
product was produced with fewer production lines. 5 Thus, for example, wire-
rod was produced with three production lines in  1974,  but  only one in  1984
(table 9.2).
* Fower firms per product.  The total Swedish output of each stainless steel
product was produced by fewer firmsE.  Welded tubes, for example, were produced
by fivo firms in 1974 but by only one in 1984  (tablo  9.2).U  Fevr  mploy.o.  Rmploymse.z  Uas the stainless  steel  lndustry  fell by more
than  40  percent  between  1974  and 1984,  and continued to  fall  untll  1989,  but
not  by  am  much.  (Employment  ftell  by  roughly  50 percent botween 1974  and
1989.)
Adjustment  before  1902
In  1974,  the  Swedish  stainlos  steel  lnduotry  conisated  of  oix  firms
Avesta,  Fagrta,  Oranges-Nyby, SandvLk, Stora-Ropparborg, 7 and  Uddehoim.  The
ownership  structure  of  the  industry  wa  fragmented,  in  sme  cases  dating  back
hundreds  of  yearo,  making  Lt  difficult  to  introduce  change.  Traditi.on  guided
most  actlvitles.  With  the  industry's  capaclty  dlvided  into  numerous,  small-
ocale  productLon  lines,  there  was  excess  capacity  overall,  and  an inofflclent
duplication  of activities.  Each firm  produced  a  wlde range  of products,  from
simple otandard products to  the most sophisticated. Before the crisis, demand
was so high that all firm  could make a  profit, even  if they were  inefficient.
once the crisis set  in in 1975, this was no longer possible. As  Claes-Ulrik
Winberg,  the chairman  of the Swedish  Employere  Confederation  during  the  1980s,
remarked  in 1976,  "What  I  find  extraordlnary  ia  that each  of the steel  flrms
apparently  finds  steel-bolling  so amusing  that,  during  long  pariods,  they
almost  entirely  ignored  the  commerelal  aspect  and consciously  or unconsecously
tried  to  cover  up  the  low  steel  profLtability  in  thelr  non-steel
activitiee  ...  ow  (quoted  in  Petterson  1988,  1451  author's  translation).
Between  1976  and  1978,  Swedish  firms  expanded  their  capacity  for
staLnless  welded  tubes  by  70  percent,  and  excekss  capacity  began  to  emerge  in
zurope  ln  1976,8  Producers  had  moved  on to  the  higher  value-added  tubes
market  when  the price  of  stainless  strip,  the  primary  input  for  welded  tubes,
started  to  fall (Petteroson  1988).  Fagerosta  and  Grangeo-Nyby  began  to  lncrease
thelr  tube capacity  Ln 1975,  and  ln 1976  Uddeholm  followed  suit,  further
lncreasing  excess  capaclty  (Pettereson  1988).
Swedish  firms  seemed  unable  to  accept  expansion  by  their  competitors  ln
Sweden.  When ono firm  expanded,  the  others  followed,  oach firm  trylng  tomaintain  its  pesltion  ln the lndustry,  whatevEr  the  consoequencos  or
profltabillty.  The  expansionu  resulted  la  lrge9  sconoziLc  loooeo  for  all  the
tirms  involved  and lrge-oscale  capLtal  dfstruction,  as  machinery  had  to  be
scrapped  ohortly  after  Lnstallation.  Again  quoting  Blr.  Winberg  in  1976:  "If
one  firm  aicorplihes  comthing  gocd  in  one  field,  thon  all  the  othor  firms
soon  follow  and  do  the  omo  thing.  Som  effforte  have  been  mado  at
coordlnation,  but  mainly  on  marginal  isoueos  Thic  in  the  most  sorious  problem
for  the  industry"  (quoted  in Potteroeon  1988,  1921  authoros  translation),
In  1979,  Granges  sold  ito  smubeidia  Granges-Nyby  to  Uddoholm,  and  the
stainless  attel  activities  of  the  two  firms  were  integrated  into  a  single  new
firm  called  Nyby-Uddeholm,  a  wholly  owned  suboidlary  of  Uddeholin.  Helping  to
make  thic  union  possiblo  was  an  extensive  serires  of  government  loans  and
credit  guarantees  known  as  structural  dolegation  loans  (discussed  later  in  the
chapter).  Those  loane  enabled  stainleso  steel  firms  to  modernise  their
equipment,  but  they  also  enabled  them  to  overinveot  in  stainless  steel  crude
unite,  where  capaelty  was  already  excessive.  Crude  steel  production  continued
to  be  spread  out  over  too  many  unite  (vovernment  of  Sweden  1984).  As  in  case
of  welded  tube,  much  of  the  Ouperfluouos  eipment  was  taken  out  of  operation
shortly  after  startup.  Once  again,  Swedish  firms  had  demonstrated  their
inability  to  give  up  any  part  of  their  market  to  their  Swedish  competitors,
whatever  the  offects  on  profitability.
AdjuBtseon  afear  1982
By  1982,  the industry  was  in  acute  financial  trouble  i&fter  yeare  of
negative  profito  (tables  9.3  and  9.4).  The  four  rmaining  firmns  --  Avosta,
agerseta,  Nyby-Uddeholm,  and  Sandvik - met  with  government  ropresentatives  to
discuss  the industry's  future.  Recognizing  that  profitability  would  have  to
guide  their  decisiono  if  the  industry  wae  to  survive,  the  four  f.rms  and  the
government  agreed  in January  1984  on  a  roorganizatlon.  Tho  firmo  gave  up  much
of  their  product  and  proceso  ldentity,  and  two  of them left  tho  lnductry
entLrely.  Two flimo  emerged  from  the roorganizatLons  Aveota,  whlch  wee  totally10
restmutured  and  becam  the  dominant  fim  in  the  industry,  and  8ondviIs  SteQi,
which  underwant  loe  extensive  changes  and  became  involved  in  jolnt  activitios
wLth  Aveista
The  following  aspects  of  the  agrement  on  the  restructuring  oi  tho
industry  went  lnto  effect  in  1984  (Motal  Bullotln,  January  13,  1984)s
*  Avesta  concentrated  oan stainless  sheet-strip  and  plate.
*  Sandvik  concentrated  on  stainless  seamises  tube,  narrow-strLp,  and  wiro).
*  Hyby-Uddeholm  was sold  to  Avesta.  The  parent  company,  Uddehole,  ls£t  tho
stainless  lndustry  and  concentrated  on  tool  steel.
* Vagersts,  once a  leading  producer  of stainless  strip  and  wire-rod,  uold  ite
stainless  operations  to  Avesta  and  Sandvik.
a  Avesta  and  sandvik  forted  two  joint  companies Avesta  Sandvik  Tube,  which
produced  stainless  welded  tub  (Avesta  owned  75  percent,  sandvLk  25  percent),
and  Fageruta  Stainless,  which  produced  stainless  wLre-rod  (fLfty-fifty
owership).
All the  partLes  Lnvolved  --  employees,  union,  ownere,  and  the  government
--  a  eo  be satisfied  wLth the  solutLon.  HavLng  most  of the  Swedish
stainless  steel  Lndustry  concentrated  in  one  firm,  Aveeta,  was expected  to
facliltate  further  restructurLng  of  the  industry  sLnee  decLaLonramking  was  now
in  the  hands  of  a  single  ower  capable  of  assuming  long-term  responsibility
for  the  industry  (Affarnvarldon,  January  25, 1984).  on the  internatLonal
scne,  Avosta  was  now  a  large  stainless  steel  producer  --  and  for  some
products,  the  largest  producer.
in  1984,  the  now  Aveosta  had  productLon  facilitiea  in  eight  locations
within  Sweden,  includLag  eoveral  redundant  units.  Most  clearly  ln  need  of
rationalizatLon  was the  capital-Lntenslve  production  of  crude  stainless  steel,
whlih  was dLopersed  across  four  locatLons  (Affaravarlden,  January  25, 1984).
As  the  managing  dLrector  of  Avesta  remarked  in  the  new  company's  first  Annual
Report  (1984)s  "A further  restructurLng  within  productLon  must  take  place.
Unnecessary  plants  must  be  closed  dwn  ln  order  to  raise  capacLty  utLlizationin  the remaining  plants.  Many  workers  and  regions  will  bo affected  (author's
translation).
In 1985,  Avesta  closed  down  the  crude  steel  unlts  from  the  old Fagerota
company,  resulting  ln a well-needed  25 percent  reductlon  ln  Sweden'o  stalnless
crude  capaclty  (OECD  1984).  It  also  closed  down  one of  its stainleso  strlp
millB  (Pettereson  1988),  But  even  after  these  consolidations  and  closures,
many  structural  problemo  remaLnod.  ProfitabLlity  was still  relatLvely  low  in
1986,  although  considerably  Lmproved  sLnce  the  formatlon  of the  new  Aveeta  ln
1984  (table  9.4).  Many of Avesta's  forelgn  competltors  had  larger-scale
productlon  unLts  and  therefore  lower  costs.  For  Avesta,  unifying  the
activities  of tt'ree  firms  (Avesta,  Nyby-Uddeholm,  Fagereta)  into  one  new
stainless  steel  firm  had  not  been  an  easy  task,  and  production  still  needed  to
be  streamlined  to  increase  profitability.  The  guidLng  prLnciples  were
increased  concentration  and  larger  scale.
in  tube production,  the concentration  that had  begun in 1984  with  the
formation  of the  Avesta  subsidiary,  Avesta-Sandvik  Tube,  was intensifLed  ln
1987,  when  Lts  tube  manufacturLng  operatLons  in  West Germany  were closed  down
and  moved  to the Swedish  works.  In 1988,  Avesta-Sandvik  Tube purchased  the
welded-tube  operations  of  its  competitor,  Mannesmann,  to  strengthen  its  world
market  position  (Avesta  1988).
Avesta  has become the largest  Western 9 producer of stainless steel
cold-rolled  wLde shoet,  hot-rolled  plate,  and  welded  stainless  tube.10
Shoet,  plate,  and  welded  tubes  represent  about  75 percent  of Avesta's  turnover
(Veckans  Affarer,  March  6, 1986),  a  development  in line  with the intentions  of
the 1984  agreament.
Restructuring  wLthin  Sandvik  proceeded  in parallel  with  that of Avesta,
but  along  different  lines.  Stainless  steel  is  only  one activity  among  many in
whlch  SandvLk  is  engaged,  representing  less  than 30  percent  of Sandvik  Group's
total  sales.  By contrast,  atainless  steel  was and  remains  Avesta's  dominant
activity.  For Sandvik,  the  most important  change  following  the 1984  agreement
was its joLnt  activitioe  with Avesta.12
Sandvik's  steel  production  in 1984  was already  streamlined  by  world
standardsg.  SandvLk  had  started  early  to  shLft  from  bul.k  products  to  more
sophLstieated  producto  (Affazsvarlden,  January  229 1986)e  becoming  more and
more  orlonted  toward  engineerLng  rathor  than  steel 0 Because of ito  engineoring
Omphasis,  SandviLk,  Liko  the  ongineerLng  Lnduasty  generally,  had  been lOes
severely  affected  by  tho  crLeLi  ln  the  1970s  than  other  staLnless  steel  firms
(table  9.4).  But  whlle  the  Sandvik  Group  wao  in  relatively  good  shape,  Lts
steel  actlvitieo  wore  in  a  more precarious  position  in 1983  (Afiaravarlden,
January  22, 1986)  becauso  of  their  poor profit  chowLng  (table  9.4). In  January
1984,  SandvLk  transferred  Lts  steel  actLvLtiLe  to  a  separate  company,  SandviLk
Steel;  steel  actLvities  showed  a  marked  increaoe  in  profitabillty  that  year.
Stainless  steel  accounts  for  about  85  percent  of Sandvlk  Steel's  sales,
with  other  hlgh-grade  steels  accountLng  for  the rest  (Affaravarlden,  January
22,  1986).  In  both  Lts  leadLgn  fiLlds,  stainless  seamless  tubes  and  drawn-
wLre,  Sandvik  Steel  strengjthened  its  world  market  position  after  the  1984
agreement.  For  stainless  seamless  tubes,  ito  dominant  product,  Sandvik  Steel
is  the  largest  producer  ln  Europe  and  second  only  to  a  Japanoes  producer  in
the  world  market  (Nordstjernan  1984).  In  1987,  Sandvik  bought  TI Stainless
Tubes,  a  BritLih  firm,  thereby  addLng  about  10,000  tons  a  year  of  stainless
tube  capaclty  to  its  25,000  ton  capacity  in  Sweden.  According  to  Sandvik
Steel's  managing  director,  "We  are looking  at  our  poitiLon  on  the  world
market,  and  through  thLs  acquLsition  we will  be more  evenly  matched  with  the
largeot  Japanese  manufacturer.  To  survLve  in  steel  you  have  to  be one  of the
biggest  on  the  market.  And  there  is only  one  markets  the  world"  (Metal
Bulletln,  December  7,  1987).  In  Lts  other  leading  product,  stainless  drawn
spring  wLre,  Sandvik  Steel  ie  the  word's  largest  producer  (Sandvik  1984).  In
1989,  Sandvik  absorbed  Gunnebo  AB's  productLon  of  drawn-wire,  further
solLdifyLng  its  domlnance  (Sandvik  1989).13
ChangOs  iA  proIt 2AibIy
For  the  stainleso  stGol  inductry,  the  turn  toward  positive  profitability
came  around  1982-83.  Basod  on roturn  on total  capital,  profitability  for  the
stainless  steel  induatry  as  a  whole  was negative  over  the  entire  crlili  perLod
of  1975-82;  11  by  comparison,  profltability  in  the  Swedish  industrial  e1ctor
(mining  and  manufacturing)  overall  was  positivo  on  avoerage  during  that  period
(table  9.3).12  In 1984,  profitability  in  the  stainleso  oteel  lnduotry  began
to  reach  the  average  level  for  the  industrial  sector  as  a  whole  and  by  1987
and  1988  had  oa3coeded  it,  Over  the  period  1980-88,  profitability  was stablo
for  the  industrial  sector  as  a  whole  but  fluctuated  widely  in  the  stainlels
steel  industry.
Using  profit  margin  as an  indicator  of profitability  shows  a  similar
trend,  but  with  a  lag  of  several  years  (table  9,4).13  The  stainless  steel
industry  began  to  show  positive  profit  margins  in  1984,  and  by  1986  it  had
caught  up  with  the  industrial  sector average.  By  1987  and  1988,  stainless
steel  was  performing  better  than  that  average.  For  the  period  1980-84,  average
profit  margins  were  stable  in  the  industrial  sector  as  a  whole  but  showed  an
increasing  trend  in  the stainless  steel  industry,
The  Swedish  govrnment' s  rolE iL  the  adjustment process
Just  as  the stainless  steel  firms  were  finally  coming  to  terms  with  the
importance  of profitability  around  1982,  the  Swedish  government's  position  on
economic  intervention  in  the  industry  was  also  being  reevaluated.  According  to
the findinge  of the 1982  Specialty  steel  Investigation  Commission  established
by  the  goverment,  governrment  stainless  steel  policies  during  the  second  half
of  the  1970o  had  in  many  ways  been  "violating  commercial  principles"
(Commission  Report,  section  II).  The  government  decided  to  "terminate  (its)
support  to  the  stainloes  steel  industry  as  soon  as possible"  and  to  let  its
policies  be  guided  by  commercial  principlea.  Thuo  in  1982,  both  the  government14
and  stainless  steel  firms  adopted  profitablity  as  the  guide  to  decisions
affecting  the  industry
Xn  1984,  the  Swedish  goverment  ended  all  support  to  the  stainless
industry.  It  offered  no  now loau  or  credit  guarantees,  wrote  off  no  more  old
loans,  and  provided  no  subsidies  of  any  kind.  The  stainless  steel  firm  were
also  told  that  they  had  to  start  paying  back  thelr  government  loans.  Before
the  end  of  1987,  both  Avesta  and  sandvi.k  had  fully  paid  back  the  governmnt
structural  loans  they  had  received  at the  end  of the  1970. (Eliasson  and
Lindgren,  interviews).
Why did  the  government  change  its  policy?  Government  fiscal  problems
were  one  reason.  But  more  fundamentally,  both  government  and  industry  had  come
to  the  realization  that  the  industry  had  to  manage  itself,  without  government
support.  Swedish  policymakers  seem  to  have  learned  from  their  past  mistakes.
In  many  cases,  government  support  had  not  really  helped  the  industry's  long-
term  survival  and  had  simply  delayed  the  needed  restructuring  and  increased
its  cost.  Furthermore,  it  was  becoming  apparent  that  government  support  to  the
industry  had  furnished  rival  producers  ln  the  United  States  and  other
countries  with  arguments  for  seeking  import  restraints  against  Swedish
stainless  steel.  As  Erik  Hook,  President  of the  Swedish  Steel  Producers
Aosociation,  Jernkontoret,  saw  the  issue  in 19770
An  expansion  based  on  government  subsidies  can  be a  deadly  trap
for  export  industries,  if  exports  decrease  because  of
protectionism  --  for  example,  the  U.S.  import  restrictions
implamerted  in  1976  on  stainless  steel  from  Sweden  and  other
countries....  With  this  in  mind,  a  number  of  steel  firms,  fearful
of losing  their  export  business,  refrained  from  seeking  subsidies
(quoted  in  Pettersoon  1988,  254t  author's  translation).
He added  in 1982s
It  smees  today  that  the  managers  of the  Swedish  steel  firms  have
come  to the  conclusion  that subsidies  and  other  support  to the
industry  does  no good and  that government  intervention  muat cometo  an  end.  Haover,  Ror  a  irml  Ln  a  dLfflicult  po6ition,  it  ia  hard
to  f3ay  Ono  thgnEI  a  to  the  as  rt  olffEred  by  the  government.
Maybe  wo  should  be  grateful  to  tho  Amoricans,  not  for  their
protectionistic  trait,  but  rather  foe  keeping  an oyo  on  Swedlih
polaLeso  and  so  helping  us to  keep  to the  narrow  way  wlthout
subaidieo  (quoted  in Rolot  1982,  9-10  author'os  trnolation).
Policy  bogago  1982
In 1975, ao the stool  crisis  settled in, aelther  the  govonernt  nor  the
industry  believed  that  the  crlsis  would  be  as long  or  as  deep  as  lt  proved.
The  objectlve  of  government  polLey  was to  bridge  the  gap  between  booms,  to
keep  production  and  employmont  at  normal  rates  untll  the  cycllcal  downturn  was
over.  No one  realized  that  the  hlgh  rates  of growth  were not  going  to  return.
he  part  of  thli  countercyclLcal  polLay,  the  goverment Lntroduced  an
inventory  support  program  in 1975  that  was available  to  all LndustrLoe.  Under
the  program,  whLih  lasted  until  mid-1977,  the  stainleoe  steel  Lndustry
stockpiled  a  large  part  of  lts  production  of  fLniahed  steel  products  for
"later  sale"  (Petterssoa  19881  table  9.5).  If  the  industry  maintained
employment  at  its  precrisis  level,  the  government  compensated  the  firms  for
their  excess  inventories  at  a  rate  of  20  percent  of  the  capital  value  of  the
stocks  in  eaceso  of  normal  levels.  Most  stalnless  steel  firms  participated  in
the  program (OECD  1980).
When the  support  program  ended  in  1977,  the  accumulated  steel  stocks  had
to  be  sold  off.  Prices  naturally  fell,  and  the  iLtuation  did  not  improve  when
the  ongineerLng  industry  and  wholesalers  also  sold  off  their  accumulated  steel
stocks.  But  price  was not  the  only  problem.  May  of the Lnventories  of
ordinary  ateel  had  virtually  rusted  away  aince  the firms  did  not  have
suff  Lient  warehouse  space  to  store  all  theLr  stocks  Lndoors.
in 1976,  the  government  established  a  commisson to investLgate  the
acute  problems  of  the  Swedish  specialty  steel  Lndustry,  partLcularly  the
staLss1o0  oteel  industry,  and  the  possLbilLtLes  for  restructurLng.  Thegovernment  belleved  that  the  stainless  steel  industry  could  be  competitLve  io
the  world  market  Ln  the  long  run,  but  that  it  need  to  modernize  it.
productLon  first  (Specialty  steel  Investigation  ComLimion  1977).  Stainless
steel  firms  would  continue  to  do  the  same  thLngs  in  the  sam  locatLons  but
they  would  do  them  with  state-of-the-art  epuipmnt  Pollcymakers  failed  to
consLder  the  fundamental  changes  that  had  occurred  ln  competitive  condtiLons
and  so  were  not  ready  to  recomend  the  major  rootructuring  of  the  Lndustry
needed  to  increaoe  profitabliLty  and  secure  its  long-term  survival  on  the
world  market.
Sinee  fims  dld  not  have  the  fLnancLal  resources  needed  to  invest  ln  new
equipment,  the  government  establLehed  the  structural  delegatLon  loan  program.
The  program  offered  loans  and  credLt  guarantes  to  flrms  for  Lnveatments
related  to  restructurLng  or  to  liquLdity  problems  during  an  unprofitable
transition  perLed  (Pettereson  1988).  In 1978  and  1979,  government  loans  and
credit  guarantees  to  the stainless  steel  Lndustry  totaled  $209  million  (table
9.6).14  The largest  share,  much  of lt  Ln  the  form  of  conditional  loans, 15
went  to the  formtion  of  Nyby-Uddeholm  in  1979  (Petterason  1988).16  The  loans
and credLt  guarantees  represented  about  10  percent  of  combined  sales  in  1978
and 1979  of Avesta,  Nyby-Uddeholm,  and  SandviLk  (Bteel  diviLion),  which
accounted  for  moot  of the industry's  sales.  Of  the  $209  mlIlion,  $62  million
went  Into  ten-year  government  loans  at  an  interest  rate of 3.75  percent  above
the  official  diocount  rate  of the  NatLonal  Bank of Sweden.  Of the rmaLnder,
conditional  loans  accounted  for  $92  million  and  credit  guarantees  for $55
million (Pettersloon  1988).
The  government  loans  and  crediLt  financed  a  restructuring  of the
stainless  steel  industry  conasiting  almost  exclusively  of  the  installation  of
more  modern  productLon equipment.  This modernization  was almost
indiscriminate,  extending  even  to  crude  steel  productLon,  whLch  was  already
plagued  by  excess  capaeLty.  Few  of  the  other  restructuring  measures
recomended  by  the  1977  ComLssLon  were  implemented.  The  new  commissLon
established  Ln  1982  argued  that  theBe  heavy  Lnvestments  had  actually  hindered17
the  necesary  restructuring  of  the  industry.  The  governmont  mado no now loans
or  credit  guarantees  to  the  stainless  oteel  inductry  aftor  1979.
PolIey  after  1983
Looses  in  the  staLnless  steel  industry  in  1981  and  1982  were  oubstantlal
(tables  903  and  904),  and  flrms  were  having  diffeculty  meeting  thelr  operating
expnnses.  The now  governmnt comisloLon  eatablLsohed  in  1982  roported  that
further  adjustmet  was  noeed  ln  the  lndustry.  The  commlttee's  guldelines  on
government  intervention  ware  qulte  resitrictive.  go  ore  public  funds  should  be
made available  to  the  lndustry,  and ownerhiLp  of  the  firms  should  remain
private  (no  nationalization).  For  exitinng  loans,  only  limited  write-offs
should  be conaidered,  ln  accordance  with  Swedish  bankruptcy  laws.  Goverment
policymakers  were convinced  that  the  industry  had  to  solve  its  own problems
and that  all  goverment support  should  be toeminated,
Nyby-Uddeholm,  wlth  $263  million 17 ln  anual  sales  in  1983,  80  percent
of it  in  export  markst0,  wao  one  of  the  largest  European  producers  of
stainless  sheet  and  tube  (Uddeholm  1983).  But  the  firm  had  run  up  substantlal
losses  snine  ita  formatlon  ln  1979  (table  9.4)  and  was  threatening  to  collapse
under  a  debt  burden  to  the  government  that  had  reached  $139  in December
1983.18  The  1982  Comalssion  had  reported  that  the  restructuring  of the
industry  depended  to  a  large  extent  on  how  Nyby-Uddeholn'  financial  problems
were  solved.
In  1983,  an  agreement  was  reached  in  accordance  with  Swediah  bankruptcy
laws  (OECD 1984).  Owners  and  private  creditors  agreed  to  lnfuse  a  mlinmum  of
$43  million  into  Hyby-Uddeholm, 19 and  the  government  agreed  to  writo  off
loans  up  to  a  value  of  $43  million" 2 0 The  parent  company,  Uddeholm,  agreed  to
take  over  responsibllity  for  repaylng  Nyby-Uddeholm's  condltional  loans
totallng  $88 mlllLon.  The contributlons  from owners  and prlvate credltors
greatly  exceeded  those  of the  goverment,  accordlng  to  an article  in Dagens
Nyhoter  (March  30, 1983),  Swedoens  largest  dAily  papor.  The  articlo  argued
that  this finlancal  roetructuring  helped  to  socuro  at  leaot  part  of thegovernsont'  fLnancial  cSiee  in  the company  lnoee,  according  to  the origLial
t  of  the  losno,  thE  conditional  loans  would  b  worLthloso  if  K  yby-Udd0holml
declared  bezk  ptcy  or  went  into  lilqudatLon.
The  aesiotenco  to  Nyby-Uddeholm  Ln 1983  woa  w,rely  a  stop  on  tho  way  to
the  restructuring  of  the  ontire  stainlees  steel  Lndustry.  got  all  tho  mattore
agreed  on in 1983  had  had  tim  to  come  to  fruitian some  woro  inotead  included
in tho  1984  agreemat. A&tor  a  period  of  negotiation,  tho  govormont  and  the
fouE  remaining  fimo  in  the  induittry  reached  an  agreement  in  1984  (c00  aloO
the  sectlon  above  on  ildustry  agreemnt.
To  enable  the  adjustment  process  to  continue,  the  government  reduced  its
$182  mil.lon  claims  on  the  new  Avesta  company  (the  consolidated  Avesta,
Fagorsta,  and  t4yby'=Uddoholm companles)  by  $59  million  (lneludlng  the  $43
million  loan  wrlte-off  to  Nyby-Uddehols).  A  condltlon  of government
partiLcpation  was  that  owners  and  other  creditorE  contribute  at  loast  equal
shares.  SE-lanken,  Sweden's  largest  bank  at  the  time,  guaranteed  at  least  $39
mllion  in  now  tockholding  eaulty  for  the  new  Avesta  through  a  public  iosue.
Uddeholm  agreed  to  infuse  $30  million  into  its  old  subsidiary,  nyby-Uddeholm,
as1 n-w  equLty  capLtal  (instead  of  the  $23  million  agreed  on  ln  1983)o  Avesta,
Pagersta,  Uddeholm,  and  Sandvlk  were  also  to  pay $13  milllon  to  an  investment
company,  which  would  create  new  jobs  in  the regLons  hurt  by  the  restructurlng
(Nordetjornan  1984).  As in  the  Nyby-Uddeholm  restructuring,  the  contributions
of  owaers  and  creditors  were  larger  than  those  of  the  goverment.
The  Swedish  government  termLnated  lts  support  to  the  stalnless  steel
industry  after  lts  particLpatlon  ln  the  agreement  of  1984.  No more  loans  were
wrltten  off  after  that.  Both  Avesta  and  Sandvik  paid  off  tholr  structural
delegation  loans  early,  as  thelt  fLnancLal  situations  improved  and  as falling
lnterest  rates  in  the  mid-1980s  made  the  loans  more  expensive  than  now  loane
at  commercLal  rates.  By  the  end  of 1987,  all  the  structural  delegatlon  loans
made to  the stt'nlesu  steel  lndustry  ln  the late  19708  had  been  fully  paid
back  (ElLaoson  and  LLndgren,  LntervLews).Xateati8na  p9glay8t^
F>or industrialized  and  industrializing  COuntri3  aiMkO,  ateel  iLO  mOr
than  an  Lnduotry.  The  word  "8teel"  han  a  strong  political  component.  Stool  lo
economic  strength,  the  symbol  of  industrialLationp  it  li  the  material  of
which  bridges,  cities,  and  manufacturing  industries  are  built.  Steel  li  the
key  to  military  defense  (Jones  1986).  A  stoel  industry  is also  a  cource  of
national  pride.  Every  country  0needsO  a  steel  industry  in  order  prosper,  just
as  every  country  "needs"  a  national  airline.  These  symbolic  attributes  of
steel  help  to  explain  why  most  governments  have  intervened  so  heavily  to  save
and  protect  their  steel  industries  during  times  of  crisis  or  import  threats.
This  was  one  reason  why  Sweden,  the  European  Comunity  (BC),  the  United
States,  and  the  other  OECD countries  agreed  in 1979  On the  need for  a  common
oet  of  principlos  covering  government  involvement  in  the steel  industry  (OECD
1988).  Theo  Ldea  wa  to  provent  governments  from  asoicting  their  dooestic
producers  to  take  over  cales  from  producers  in  other  countrioo.  Two principles
wore  to provide  guidances
S "Do  not  ozport  your  problemse.  Governments  were  not  to  holp  their  domestic
industries  increase  their  world  market  shares  through  ozpansion  based  oan
subsidies  or other  government  support.
EJ "No  import  restrictions."  Countries  were  to  eliminate  or  minimize  import
restraints  on  steel  that  restricted  foreign  sales  in the  domestic  market.
The  following  sections  evaluate  the  performance  of  Sweden,  the  EC,  and
the  United  States  against  these  criteria  and  compare  Sweden's  performance  with
that  of  the  EC and  the  United  States.
Stodon
From  the  beginning  of the  crisis  in  the steel  industry  in 1975  up  to
preoent,  Sweden'o  shares  of  world  production  and  exports  have  doelined  (table
9.7  and  9.8).  Since  the  Swedish  stainless  steel  induotry,  whether  subsidized20
or  not, has  not  expanded  in  the  world  market,  Sweden  cannot  be  said  to  have
violated  the first  criterion.
As  for  the second  rule  on  avoiding  beggar-thy-neighbor  policies  by
aiding  local  producers  through  import  restrictions,  Swediah  policymakers  have
long  been  acutely  aware  of  Sweden's  dependence  oi  trade.  a  large  proportion  of
Swedish  production  is exported  and  much  of its  consumption  is imported.  Free
trade  Lo  the  alm  of  Swedish  trade  policy.  Free  trade  agremento with  the  SC
and  the  European  Free  Trade  Assoclation  (EFTA)  covered  95  percent  of Sweden's
imports  of  stainless  steel  in  1989,  leavlng  only  a  marglnal  part  of  stainless
steel  imports  subject  to  tarLffs 0
21 And  at  least  since  the  19709,  Sweden's
tariffs  for  stainless  steel  product  have  been  lower  than  those  of  the  EC and
considerably  lower  than  those  of  the  United  States  (table  9.9).  So  with  95
percent  of lts  imports  duty-free,  with  low  tariffs  on  the  remainder,  and  with
no quantitatlve  restrlctlons  --  no  quotas,  no  voluntary  export  restraint
agreements,  no  addltional  tariffs  --  it  follows  that  Sweden  has  not  violated
the  Ono  import  restrlctionew  criterion.
European  Commuity
State  lntervention  has  been  the  noxm  in  the  European  steel  industry  for
generations.2  A  multilateral  diemnsion  was  added  to  the  picture  with  the
signlng  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1951,  which  established  the  European  Coal
and  Steel  Community,  the  predecessor  to  the  European  Common Market.  The  goals
of  the  treaty  were  mainly  political  --  peace  and  Lntegratlon  --  the  economics
was  moatly  French.  As  interpreted  by  Patrick  Meisserlin  (1987),  a  noted  French
economist,
The  Treaty  of  Paris...  is  the  product  of  the  antimarket  ethos  of
France  in  the 1950s,  which  saw  the  economac  future  in  terms  of a
reconcLllation  between  planning  and  unconstralned  competition....
By  favorLng  a  process  of  cartel  formation  within  each  country,  the
result  of  the  Treaty  of  Parls  has  been  the  preservatlon  of  each  of
the national  steel  industries  regardless  of its  competitlve21
statuge,  and  the  substitution  of comaptition  among  otato(s  for
compaettive  market  forces,  creating  a  highly  unstable  oenvironmont
(p.  124).
As Europe  moved  to  become  one  market,  intense  competition  arose among
the  membor  otates  to  oeploit  the  opportunities  created  by  the  removal  o8
internal  trade  barriers. State financing  of  now  technology  and  capacity
expansion wore  important  dinionsoin  of thic  internal  competition 0 In  1975,
steel  prices  within  the  EC fell  40  percent  below  1974  priecs  and  export  prices
fell  50  percent.  Capacity  utilization  dropped  from  87  percent  to  66  percent,
never  again  ricing  above  69  percent,  and  yet  capacity  continued  to  be  expanded
through  1980  (Tsoukalic  and  Strauss  1987,  195).
A central  feature  of  the Treaty  of  Paris  was  the  creation  of  a basing-
point  pricing  oystem  that  had  the  effect  of ruling  out  price  competition
within  the Community.  Each  country'o  national  steel  cartel  set  its  pricee,  and
producers  from  other  countrieo  could  not legally  export  to  that  country  except
at  the  pricea  set  by.the  importing  country's  cartel.  one  objective  of this
collective  management  of  the steel  industry  was  to  maintain  "remunerative"
prices.  These  prices  made  even  inefficient  plants  look  profitable  (or  at  least
potentially  profitable,  if  they  could  achieve  sufficient  sales  volume)  and
led,  plant-by-plant  and  national  cartel  by  national  cartel,  to  pressures  to
expand  output  and  capacity.  Of course,  with  "remunerative"  prices  set
considerably  above  the  market-clearing  level,  there  was  an  adding-up  problems
the  sum  of  what  all  producers  wanted  to  produce  was considerably  above  the  sum
of what  European  users  wanted  to  buy.
One  result  of  this  excess  supply  was  a  significant  expansion  of European
exports  to  the  United  States.  Another  result  was the  attempt  to  use  political
inotruento  to  reduce  output  and  capacity  and  to  reach  agreement  on  reductions
ln  state  subsidles --  the  Splnelli,  Simonet,  and  Davignon  plans.  But  these
political  instruments  were  often  captlve  to  polltical  interests.  In  plant
closure  and  lnvestment  approval  decislons,  member  state  governments  found  it
convenLent  to  pass the  buck  to  the  EC Commission  --  to  side  wlth  thalr22
industry  and  lot  the  Comm30iio,,%  take  the  blam  for  cutbacks.  The Commission,
still  attempting  to  establish  its  authorLty,  was reluctant  to  be no oevere  an
to  tempt  the  m  r  tate  governments  not  to  acquiesce  in its  decisLons,  no
rulLngs  on Lnternal  dioputes  were relatively  mlld. "The  most lmportant
unLfyLng  factor  for  CommnLty countriLs  durLng  the  crisiL  was the need  to
preserve  the  coon  market  and  thus avoid  the  spread  of national  protectLonLit
measures.  Once  the purely  national  eolutlon  was abandoned,  other  thLngs
mmnediately  followed"  (Teoukalie  and  Strauss  1987,  216,  emphasis  added).
The "other  thLngs"  Lncluded  a CoamunitywLde  price  floor,  limLts  on
imports,  and  collectLve  negotLations  wLth the  outslde  to defend  EC exports.
The  EC CommissLon  augmented  lts  control  of the  external  dimensions  of the
program  by establishLng  a  license  and  monitorLng  system  for Liporto  and  by
LnstitutLng  antLdumpLng  actlons  against  imorts prLced  below  established  base
prices.
The  EC's shares  in  both  production  and  exports  of  stainless  steel
increased  over  the  period  1974-89,  Lndicating an expanslon  relative  to  the
rest  of the  world (table  9.7  and 9.8).  At the same  tlme,  the  EC mmbor
countries  subsidized  their  otaineass  steel  industries  (Jernkontoret  Annual
Report  1981  and  Pettorseon  1988).  It  eaems,  therefore,  that tho  EC violated
the "Do  not  export  your  prcGbleme"  criterion  by subsidLiing  the expansion  of
theLr  stainless  steel  industrieo  at  other  countreis'  expense.
United  States
Throughout  the 1970s  and 1980s,  the  United  States  had  quantitative
import  restrictions  or additLonal  tarLffe  on most stainless  steel  products.  It
has also  long  had  voluntary  export  restraint  agreements  with most of the  major
stainless  steel  produeing  countries  except  Sweden,  Canada,  and  Taiwan,  whlch
refused  such  agreements  (Jernkontoret  Annual  Report  1987).  Thus,  the  United
States  has  vLolated  the "No import  restrictLons"  eriterLion  In additLon,  the
United  Statoo  hae  used antidumping  and  other  unfair  trade  actLone  to further
restriLt  importe.  These  actLons  are  describod  in  the following  oection,23
U.G.  trade  rmafest  ases
Tho  Sweisch  tainlos  oteel induatry's  rocord  of  good  oconomics  and good
international citison8hip has not shiolded it from attack  by the trade romedy
laws of other countrics, The  stainloss  steel  induatry  in  the  United  States,
like  the  entice  U.S. steel  industry,  hae  actively  used  various  prrwviLons  of
U.S.  trade  law  to restrict  import  competition  from  Sweden  as  much  ae from
any  other  country.  And  they  have  been  successful,  Imports  from  both  Swedish
firma,  Sandvik  steel  and  Avosta,  (including  Avesta's  subsidiary,  Avesta
Sandvik  Tube),  are  presently  under  antidumping  orders  in  the  United  Statoe.
The  use  of  trade  remedies  to  restrict  imports  from  Sweden  is not  an
aberration. It  is  an  example  of  the  trade  remedies  process  at  work.  This  bit
of comercial  history illustrates  the "shotgun approach" developed by import-
competing  industries  ln the  United  States  (table  9.10).  The strategy  li  to
file a  multitude of patitiono  using every provision of the trade law. The
political dimension of this strategy is to  publicize the industry's
accusationa againot  oxportoer  and so to buLld up  political  pressures  to  do
something  for  tho industry.  The  complementary  legal  dimension  is  to  explore
the  various  ways "dumping," "injury,"  "product,"  and  "lndustry"  can  be
specified  untll  a  combination  lo found  that  the  government  agrees  merlts  an
afflrmatlve  determlnation.  Dumplng  is  whatever  an  lndustry  can  get  the
government  to  act  against  under  the  antidumping  law.
many  cases  under  many  legal  provisions
The  first  U.S.  unfair  trade  case  againet  Swedish  stainless  steel  was
brought  ln 1972  agalnst  Avesta  stainless  steel  plate.  The  antidumplng  order
that  resulted  from  the  case  L  still  in  place.  (Jernkontoret  Annual  Report
1985).  Through  the  middle  1980n  Avesta  provided  information  for  annual  prlce
reriews,  arguing  each  time  that  the  record  showed  no  dumping  by  Avesta,  and
requesting  that  the  antidumping  order  be  lLfted.  Through  these  reviews  Avesta
did  succeed  in  negotiating  a  smaller  dumping  margin,  but  dld not  succeed  in24
having  the  order  lifted.  Since  1987,  Aveeta  has  not  requested  a  price  reviow.
In  thus  declining  to  contest  the  antidumping  duties  aosessed  againat  it,
Avesta  thereby  avoids  the  legal  and  administrative  expanses  of a  review.
In  1974,  voluntary  export restraint  agresmento  on  Japanese  and European
specialty  steel exports  to  the  United  States  expired.  Immediately  thereafter,
the  U.S. industry  filed  a  petition  for  import  relief  under  section  201  of  U.S.
trade  law,  the safeguards  or  escape-clause  provision.  Consiatent  with  Article
XIX of  the  GATT code,  section  201  allows  petitions for  restrictions  on  imports
that  are  injuring  a  U.S. industry.  The  fairness  or  unfairness  of the imports
is  not  at  Lasue,  only  the  matter  of Lnjury  to  competLng  U.S.  production.  The
U.S. International  Trade  CouimLisEion reported  an  affirmatlve  fLnding  of  injury
to  U.S.  producers  of  stalnlesa  steel  sheet-strLp,  plate,  bar,  and  wire-rod  and
recommended  import  quotas.  President  Ford  accepted  the  finding,  but  before
impo8Lng  quotas  unilaterally,  he attempted  to  negotiate  voluntary  restraints
with  leading  exporters.  Only  Japan  complied.  In  June  1976,  the  president
announced  a  three-year  agreement  with  Japan  and  the impositLon  of quantitative
restrictLons  agaList  all  other  suppliera,  Lneluding  Sweden.  The  restrLitLons,
which  were  extended  by  President  Carter,  rmaiLned  in  place  until  February
1980,
In  1981,  the  U.S.  stainlese  steel  industry  filed  a  section  301  petition
against  imports  from  the  EC,  AustralLa,  and  Sweden,  allegLng  illegal
penetration  of the U.S.  market  as a  result  of subsidies  to  dmestLe
production.  The  petition  covered  the  products  that  had  been  under  quantLtative
restriction  between  1976  and  1980.  The  Office  of the  U.S.  Trade  Representative
opened  an  investigation  ln  1982,  but  before  the  LnvestLgatLon  was completed,
PresLdent  Reagan  dlrected  that  it  be  converted  to  a  sectLon  201  case  --  a
fair  but  LnjurLous"  case  Lnstead  of  an  aunfaLr  trades  case (Hufbauer,
Berliner,  Elliott  1986,  195).  The  presLdent  also  instructed  the  U.S.  Trade
Representative  to  monitor  imports  subject  to  the  section  201  investigatLon  and
to  contLnue  consultatLons  with  Sweden  and  other  countrles  to  elimLnate  all
trade-distorting  prar:tLces.  In  March  1983,  the  InternatLonal  Trade  CommiaLion25
returned  a  unanimoua  determination  of injury,  and  in  July  1983  the  president
imposed  import  controls  for  four  years,  retroactive  to  January  1983.
Quantitative  restrictions  were  impooed  on  otainleso  stGol  bar  and  wire-rod,
ar3  increased  tariffe  were  imposed  on  stainless  sheet-strip  and  plate
(Hufbauer,  Berliner,  Elliott 1986,  195).
In  December  1985,  elevon  U.S.  producers  filed  another  section  301  case,
this  time  against  Swedish  stainleso  tubeo  and  drawn-wire,  claiming  that
subsidized  Lmports  from  Sweden  had  contributed  to  the  closing  down  of  mills
and  had  increased  unemployment  in  the  United  States.  The  Swedish  authoritieo
and  the  firms  involved  held  the  position  that  the accusations  had  no  solid
basis. Before the U.S. Trade Representative had decided whether to investigate
the claim, the U.S. firms withdrew their petition. Almost immediately, the
U.S. producers filed a  now section 301 petition, similar in content to the
previouo one, but more sharply drawn. This petition was also withdrawn  (in
March 1986) shortly after the U.S. Trade Representative had agreed to start
negotiations with the Swedish counterparts and before a decision had been
reached  on  whether  to  undertake  an  investigation  (Jernkontoret  Annual  Repore
1985).  A third  301  petition  was  submitted,  virtually  identical  to  the  previous
one.  The U.S.  Trade  Representative  declined  to  open an investigation,  however,
on grounds  that  the  matter  was  being  handled  by  the  countervailing  duty  and
antidumping  cases  that  the  U.S.  industry  was  pursuing  simultaneously.23
In  the  countervailing  duty  case,  the  Department  of Comerce reached  an
affirmative  preliminary  determination,  finding  a  subsidy  margin  of 2.18
percent  on  the  exports  of  Avesta-Sandvik  Tube.  However,  in  March  1987,  the
International  Trade  Commilsion  concluded  that  the  tube  imports  had  not  injured
the  U.S. industry,  and  the import  price  monitoring  and  deposit  requirement
resulting  from  the  preliminary  determination  were  revoked.
In  the  antidumping  case  against  Swedish  stainless  tubes,  the
International  Trade  Commiasion  ruled  that  imports  from  Aveeta-Sandvik  Tube
(welded  tubes)  had  not  injured  the  U.S.  industry  but  that  dumped  imports  from
Sandvik  Steel  (seomloso  tubeo)  had  causod  ouch  injury.  The  Commerce  Department26
impomed  an antidumpiLgn  duty  oi 20.47  percent  on Sandvik  Steoll's  ecsoloos  tube
sales  in the  Ualted  States,
U.S.  producers  appealed  the  negativo  injury  finding  in  tho  welded  tubos
case  to  the  U.S.  Court  of  International  Trade.  The  Court found  procedural
errEor in the International  Trado  CommiosionsB investigation and  asked for
reconsideration  of  the  case.  Thle  time,  the  International  Trade  Cavaissoon
returned an affirmative  finding  of  injury.  SLnce December  1990,  an  antidumping
order  and  an antldumplng  duty  of 34.5  percent  have  been in  effect  against
Avesta-sandvik  Tube'o  welded  tube  importa  (Amaerlan  Hotel  Market,  December  5,
19901  Metal  Bulletln,  Auguot  13,  1990).  The  duty  offectivoly  halted  all
exports  to  the  United  States.  According  to  Goran  Kullman,  marketing  director
of  Aveeta-Sandvik  Tube,  OAfter  the  U.S. antidumping  duty  was  imposed  in  the
beginning  of  December,  we  completely  stopped  the  stainless  welded  tube
deliveries  from  Sweden  to  the  United  Statoe.  Tho  high  duty  of  around  35
percent  makoo  euporto  imposoibloe  (intorviow,  January  1991).24
heo Sandvik  stool  antldumpJAY  caoo
A  clocer  oeamination  of tho  Sandvik  steel  antidumping  caso  lo
instructive  for  lto  lllumination  of  the  workings  of  the  natloanal  and
international  antidumping  machlnery,  with  its  proceduroe  for  all  ooaa'ons  and
all  reaconQ.  That  machinery  is  not  doeigned  to  cift  the  evidence  for  the
correctneso or  incorrectness of  a  disputed  activity  in any rational  business
or economic  sense.  Rather,  it is  designed  to  shift  its  procedural  gears  until
the right  one is found  that  will  move  the  process  along  to  an affirmative
finding  of dumping  and  injury.
In  October  1986,  six  U.S.  specialty  steal  firms  filed  a  dumping  claim
against  imports  of stainleas  steel  welded  tubes  from  Avesta-Sandvik  Tubs  and
seamless  tuboe  from  Sandvik  Steel.  In  a  preliminary  determination  in  November
1986,  the  International  Trade  Commission  found  that  the  lmports  had  caused  or
threatened  to  cause  injury  to  the  U.S. industry.  In  May 1987,  the  Commerce
Departmnt made  a  preliminary  afflirmative  determination  of  dumping  and  imposed27
p;lr  na  dutioo  botween  31.46  porcont  and 60.65  porcont.  Xn tho
DfoFgnt's  final  dotermLnation  Ln  OctobEr,  dutioo  wreo  calculated  at  26.46
percent  ior  BandvIlF  Stocol  anOd  34.5 pEorcent  fog AvoestaSandlvik  Tubo  (GATT
1988a)  Ao  noted  above,  the International  Trade  CsoLon  found  that  only
imports from Sandvik Stool (eOEMlooo tuboe)  had  camusd lijury  to  U.S.
producoro. Agtor corgections wore made for technical  errors  brought  to  the
attention  of  the  Commerce  Departmnt by  Sandvik  Steel  and  the petitioners
(GW0  I19D90)e,  tho  duty  on  Sandvik  Steel's  tuboo  was sot  at  20.47  porcent,  and
definitive  antidumping  dutieo  at  that gate  wegro impsod in  December  1987  (GATT
1988b).
Sweden  contendod  that  the  imposd duty  waa  not  in accordance  with  the
provioLona  of  tho  GATT  Antidmping Code and  requested  consultations  wlth  U.S.
authorites,a  which  wore  hold in  July 1988.  Aftor  failing  to  reach  an
acceptable  solution,  Sweden  referred  the  case  to  the  GaTT Antidumping
Committee  in  Seoptembr  1988  (GATT  1988a).  Sweden  argued  that  the U.S.
investigation  had  not  demonstrated  a  causal  link  beatween  dumping  and  injury  to
U.S. induotry, pointing out thatt  Swedeans exports to the  United States  had
actually  declined  during  (and  since)  tho  period  in  which  the  U.S.
invoetigation  had  found  dumping.  Sweden's  brief  also  raised  a  number  of  other
points,  relating  mainly  to technical  and  procedural  matters.  Chief  among  them
was  the discrepancy  between  the  time  period  covered  by  the  injury
investigation  and  that  covered  by the  dumping  investigation.
The  GATT Antidumping  Committee  held  a  special  meeting  in  October  1988  to
consider  Sweden's  pocition.  When  the  committe3e  was  unable  to  reach  a  solution
s3atifactory  to  both  Sweden  and  the  United  Statoo,  Sweden  requested  that  the
committoe  convene  a  panel  to investigate  the case.  The  panel  was  established
in  January 1989, dsopite procedural objoctions  from the  United  States  (GATT
1989b)o  This  was only  the  third  occasion  aince  GATT's  formation  in 1947  that
an  antidumping  complalnt  had  been  appealed  to  a  GATT panel.
in  August  1990,  the  panel  reported  ite  finding  that  the  antidumping
dutieo  on  Swedish  stainless  tuboo  violated  Article  V of the  GATT Antidumping28
Code becausie  the U.S.  investigation  had  been  .nItiated  before  verifLcatLon
that  the  petitloners  represented  the  U.S. Lndustry.  The panel  report
re  anded  that  the antLdumping  order  be lifted,  but  the  GATT  Antidumping
Committes,  wblch  has  authorlty  over  such  dlsputes,  hae  not  yet ruled  on  the
pnel's  recomandatLon  because  the  Unlted  States  hao  blocked  the  report  from
tho c§anittee's  agenda.
o economliC  or  bualness  ogi c  to  unfaix  trade  actions
The  point  of  this  discusioon  Ls  not  to  argue  that  the  United  States  Ls
correct  or  that  Sweden  is,  but  rather  to illustrate  that  "correct"  has  no
meanlng other  than an  arbltrary  one.  An antidumplng  lnvestlgatlon  ie a
collection  of  tochniealitles  with  no  overridlng  economlc  or  business  logic.
The  parties  involved  win  or  lose  on  procedural  technlealities.
Step  by  step,  the  U.S. iLnvetigations  of  dumping  and  of injury  followed
the  U.S.  rules.  But  the  investigation  of dumplng  covered  July-December  1986,
whlle  the  investlgation  of  injury  found  that  Limport  from  Sweden  had  lncreased
in  1983  and  1984  but  had  decreased  thereafter.  The  impliect  logic  of  the
affilmatve determinatlons  that  resulted  from  these  investlgations  war  that
caune  came after  effect.  The  GATT  panel  chose  not  to  take  up  this  point  and
focused  lsntead  on  a  procedural  detall.  They  found  the  U.S. investigation  to
be  faulty  because  of  the  timing  of  the  U.S.  government's  examination  of the
petitloners'  standlng  to  represent  the  relevant  U.S. industry.  (The  panel  did
not  questlon  the  "how'  or  the  "if"  of  this  matter,  only  the "when.")
Sweden's  experience  with  U.S.  trade  remedies  illustrates  one  further
point.  The  cases  themselves  are  only  skirmishes  in  a  contLnuous  legal-
administrative  campaign.  The reader  should  not  presume  that  once  a  case  ie
deiLded,  the  accused  exporter  can  diecharge  legal  counBel  and  go  back  to  the
busLness  of  producing  and  selling  --  burdened  perhaps  by  a  new  restriction,
but  at  least  knowing  preeisely  what  that  restrlction  iL.
Leas  than a  year after  President  Reagan  imposed  the  1983  restrletlons
undor  section  201,  the  U.S. ladustry  complalned  that  production  protected  by29
increased  tarlffs  was  disadvantaged  relative  to  production  protected  by
quantitative  restrictLion  and  asked  that  quotas  be  substLtuted  for  the
tariff..  ThLo  meant  another  round  of  investigations  and  consultatLons 0
Likewise,  the  petitLoner  ln  the  1986  antidumpLng  investlgation  was  not
deterred  by  the  U.S. InternatLonal  Trade  CommLssLon's  1987  fLndLng  of no
injury  to  U.S.  welded  tube  producer..  The  petitioner  went  almot  ilsedLately
to  the  Federal  court  and  after  two  years'  persistence  achLived  a  reversal  of
the desiLLon. Thus  "victoryw  Ln  the  okLisLoh  at  the U.S. International  Trade
COmmiseLon  in 1987  dLd  not end  the  SwedLeh  welded  tube  exporter's  engagement
in  the  legal  battle,  and  lt  did  not  reduce  the  uncertainty  the  SwediLh
exporter  faced  in the  termo  and  conditLons  under  which  lt  could  do  business  Ln
the  UnLited  States.
That  uncertainty  includes  the  added  rlsk  ln  the  U.S.  market  posed  by  the
threat  of antLdumping  actions.  The  threat  itself  may be suffLcient  to  reduce
exports  to  the  United  States.  The  managLng  director  of  a  Swedish  specialty
steel  fim  commented  ln  April  1991  that  because  of  the  incroased  risk  of
fallLng  under  a  U.S. antidumping  order,  the  firm's strategy  in  recent years
has  been  to  downplay  its  efforts  to  penetrate  the  U.S.  market.  The  risk  of an
antLdumping  actlon  is  vLewed  as an  increased  coat  that  reduces  the
profitabillty  of the  U.S.  market  eompaxed  to  other,  leos  protectLonist
countries.
conclusion
The  main  lesson  of  this  chapter  is  that  good  economLcs,  international
competLtlveness,  prlvate  ownership,  and  lmLted  support  from  a  government
demonstratlng  good  international  cLtlzenshlp  are  not  enough  to  defend  an
industry  agalnst  the  application  of antLdumping  or  other  import-reetrLitLng
policy.
The SwedLih  stalnless  steel  industry  responded  to  the  world  erLeLs  in
the  steel  maket  ln  the 1970s  with  a  major  restructurLng  of  the  industry.  By30
whole-heartedly  applying  the  piLnilveQ  of  profitability  to  dociinWQkaking,  the
industry  transfo  itd  sel  into  a  healthy,  intogrnatocaally  coemptitivo
Lndustry.  Today 0 the  two  gzaining  stalnless  stool  firwo  in  Swodon  oag  mong
the  world  leaders  in  their  fields  and  are  the  world's  largeot  producero  of
sam  staLnloes  steel  products.
During  this  transfomation 9 otainlese  atool  ELMo  aloo  learned  to  got
along  without  govrnment  Lntervention.  After  1982,  tho  government'o  policy
toward  the  industry  changed.  The  government  ended all  direct  support  to tho
industry  in 1984,  and  by the  end of 1987,  atBinle8S  8t551  firms  had  pald  back
all  of their  structural  delegation  loans  dating  freo  the late  1970s.  In
addiLtion  the  SwedLih  government,  in  LtB  compliance  with OECD criteria  guiding
national  steel  polLcy,  demonstrated  batter  internatLonal  citizenship  than
either  the  United  States  or  the  European  cmunLity.  The  negative  findings  of
the  U.S.  counterva1ilng  duty  and  sectLon  301  cases  agaLnst  Sweden  offered
further  support  that  the  Swedlh  government's  role  in  the  stainless  steel
induotry  was  clearly  within  the  bounds  of  the  integnatiLonal  understanding  of
what  that role should be.
Producers  in  the  Unlted  States,  meanwhile,  were uhopping  around  for  ways
to  restrict  imports  of Swedish  stalnless  steel  products.  They actively  sought
protection  under  every  available  provisLon  of  U.S. trade  laws (table  9.10).
Efforts  under  sectLon  301  and  countervaliLng  duty  laws  failed,  but  their
claim  under  section  201  resulted  ln  the impositlon  of  quotas  and  addltlonal
tari£ff  covering  most  stainless  steel  products  for  over  ten  years.  Those  under
antidumping  provisions  resulted  in  the  imposetion  of  duties  that  are  still  in
effect  for  stainless  steel  plate  (Avesta),  welded  tubes  (Avesta-Sandvik  Tube),
and seamless  tubes (sandvlk  Steel).  Thli  extensive  use  of  trade  remedies  cases
agalnst  Swedish  stainless  steel  is  not  an  aberratlon,  but  rather  an
illustrative  example  of how  the system  generally  works.
on  the  Sandvik  Steel  antldumping  case,  Sweden  complained  to  the  GATT,
whleh  establshed  an  antldumpLng  panel  to  investiLgate  the  case.  The  panel's
recommndatLon that  the antidumping  order  be 1lfted  was based  not  on  a31
consideration  of  the  broad  issue  of  whose  position  war  right  from  a  ratlonal
economLi  or  business  perspectlve,  but  on  the  procedural  detall  of  when  the
U.S.  government  had  verifled  that  the  petitioner  represented  the  industry
allegedly  being  harmed  by  the  alleged  dumping.  Just  as  "dumping"  li whatever  a
domestic  lndustry  can  got  lts  government  to  act  against  under  antidumpng law,
so  "not  dumping"  Le  whatever  a  GATT panel  cites  as grounds  to discredit  an
antldumplng  order.32
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1.Measured  at  the  crude  steel  stage  (tonnage)  for  the  entlre  oteel  industry
(Frits  1988).
2.It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  process  for  making  stainless  steel  improved
conaiderable  ln  the  1970s  and  19808.  Less  crude  steel  was  needed  to  produce  a
gLven  quantity  of  flnLhed  stainless  steel  --  the  decrease  in  production  of
finished  products  was omaller  that  the  decrease  ln  productlon  of  crude  lteel.
Only  crude  steel  statlitlcs  are  available  (Jernkontoret).
3.While  thle  figure  is  for  the  entire  specialty  steel  sector,  employment  in
the  stalnleso  steel  industry,  which  accounted  for  about  half  the  sector's
sales,  Ls  estimated  to  have  followed  a  similar  trend  (Jernkontoret  1989).
4.Capacity  utilization  (actual  production  as a  percentage  of  potential
production)  in  the  Swedish  steel  industry  fell  from  an  internationally  high
level  of  86  percent  in  1974  to  56  percent  in  1977  (Pettereson  1988).
5.Production  line  refors  to  the  number  of  machines  ln  one location  that
together  perform  a  task,  such  as  making  wire-rod  from  crude  or  semlfinished
stainless input.
6.Data  for the entlre  speclalty  steel industry,  of  which  stainless  constitutes
around  half  and  is estimated  to  have  followed  a  smLilar  trend (Jernkontoret
1989).
7.Stora-Kopparberg  closed  down  its  stainless  divislon  in the  mid-1970..
8.After  the  expanaion,  Sweden  had  about  10  percent  of  world  capacity  in  welded
tube  productlon  (excluding  the  Eastern  bloc,  for  whlch  comparable  data  are not
available).
9.Comparable  data  are  unavailable  for the Eastern bloc.
10.Xncluding  the  majorlty-owned  AST company.
ll.Eotimated  by  Jornkontoret.  Data  for  the  years  before  1980  are  not  shown  ln
table  9.3  because  rellable  data  are  unavailable  for  the  stainless  steel  firms
that  were  parts  of larger  groups  --  Sandvik,  Nyby-Uddeholm,  Fagersta,  and
before  1979,  Grangee-Nyby  and  Stora-Kopparberg.
12.0ee  Narlngollvets  Ekonomlfakta  (1989)  for  lnformatlon  covering  the  whole
period.
13.Data  on  Fagersta's  stainless  steel  division  and  on  Granges-Nyby  could  not
be  lncluded  ln  table  9.4  slnce  both  were  parts  of  larger  dlversified  groups,
and  financial  statistics  were  not  available  by  dlvislons  or  subeidiaries.
Therefore,  table  9,4  contains  data  on  the  stainless  oteel  industry  as  a  whole
only  for  1984-88.  Fagersta's  stalnless  dlvliion  is,  however,  included  ln  table
9.3,  whlch  make  lt  possible  to  present  industry  data  covering  a  longer  period.33
14.All monetaxy amounts in this chapter haveD  boen converted from Swedish krona
to  U.S. dollars, using the average yearly selling rate provlded by the Swedilh
Natlonal Bank. The rate umod for tho structural delegations loans dlisussed
later in the chapter ie the averago for  1978-79.
15.The  interect rate on condltlonal loans was equal to that  on lnduotrlal
bonds. Loan repayment dld not have to begin unt1i the firm stated  to make a
profit, although lnterest wae calculated feom the flrst  day  of  the loan
(Jernkontoaret  internal document, 1980).
16.The  $209  mlllion  lncludes  the $57  million  ln  conditional  loans  that  were
wrltten over to Nyby-Uddeholm froam  it  parent company Uddeholm in 1979.
Uddeholm had recolved $136 million ln condltlonal loans in 1977, but only $57
mllion  applied to stainless steel activities (Governmnt  of Sweden  1984).
17.From 1978=79 to 1983, the U.S. dollar increased sharply against the Swedish
krona (SKr), which affects compariaons over time of krona converted into
dollars.  The 1978-79  average  exchange  rate  was US$1  - 4.4  SKr3  the  rate  in
1983 was US$1 - 7.7 SKr. The 1983 exchange rate ie used for all conversions  in
the discussion of loans to Nyby-Uddeholm and the Stalnless Steel Agreement of
1984.
18.Conditional loans constituted 63 percent, "normal"  loans (interest rate of
3.75 percent above the officlal discount rate of the National Bank of Sweden,
repayment  within  ten  years)  26  percent,  and  credlt  guarantees,  11  percent
(Government  of  Sweden  1984)o
19.Nyby-Uddeholmls parent company,  Uddeholm,  agreed  to  infuse  $23  million  in
new equLty  capital  in  Nyby-Uddehole, whlch had only about $4 million in eqity
capltal at the tlme. Granges  (parent of the old Granges-Nyby company) agreed
to  pay  $7  million  to Nyby-Uddeholm,  as an exchange  of earlier  claims  relating
to the Nyby-Uddsholm formatlon 1979. The SE-Banken, Sweden's largest bank at
the time, agreed to guarantee a public  issue of new equity capital  (Dagens
ilyheter,  March 30, 1983)o
20.Swedish bankruptcy laws apply to all creditors, public and prlvate. The
government's role in these agreements lndlcated that it had shifted from
interventlonist policies  to  a reliance on commercial principles.
21.Only  0.9 percent of imports came from the Unlted States. And according to
the Swedish Steel Producers Association, Jernkontoret, U.S. stainless steel
producers do not consider Sweden --  or Europe  generally --  a relevant export
market.
22.The  best  source  on  support  to  the  steel  industries in the SC and its member
countrieo is Meny and Wright (1987).
23.Sewlannual Report  to  Congress, July-December 1985, as requlred by section
306 of the Trade Act of 1974,
24.Avesta's U.S. subeidiary purchased Armco's tube mill in Florlda in July
1990, just Ln time to soften the impact of the high antldumplng duties on
welded tube exports to the Unlted States (Metal Bulletin  August 13, 1990).  It
would be interesting to investigate whether a positive  relationship exlits
between a country's use of antidumplng actlons and foreign dlrect lnvestment
in  that country..-4
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Table 1 Number of lu  conbolling tSe  stalne  sl  industyp
197'3e  1X7, and 1984
Number
Yewr  offirm  Rbms
1974  6  Avest  Fagesta,  Gramges-Nyby,  Sanvik,
Stora-Kopparberg,  Uddeholm
1979  4  Avesta,  Fagsta.  Nyby-Uddeholm,  Saudvik
1984  2  Avesta, Sandvik  Steel
Source: Jerkontoret.
Table 2 Number of frms and produeion Unes  producng  totl  Swedish
output of each  stainless  steel product, 1974  and 1984
1974  1984
Sta  kessproduc  Finn  Lins  Frm  Lines
Plat  3  3  1  2
Sheet-strip  4  4  1  3
Bar  3  3  1  1
Wire-rod  3  3  1  1
Weldedt bes  5  5  1  3
Source:  Petersson  (1988).37
Table  3 PollftablUty:  Retumn  on total  aplta  I  Swe  stain  steel Industry com
with h  lndustrl  sector avs  19
(profit as a  a  etgeof  total  capital)
Indsf  19W  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1
Stness  stel
indu1t9 5 -1 5b  6. 2 b  -1.0  4.1  9.4  7.0  3.8  11.7  20.8w
Industial
sector averaged  7.0  6.5  8.3  10.4  10.5  9.4  7.8  7.9  8.5
Noto:  Prfits  inue  of pland  d  _  au finanil  rev  a  excluding  fcial  coa  and tam.  Toa  capial
ind  equy  pbu det
a. Daft for 1980-83  inchldo  Avesta,  Fagma,  Saivik,  and Nyby-Uddeholm;  dat  for 198448 inhclde  t  naw Aveet
(Cuding  Avea4andvik  Tube), SLaivk  and tel Avaut-Sandvi joiny  owned  FageuPa  ShtAis.  No pre-1980  figur  are
provided  bomm data on Mainim at  ped tpae  ould  not ho spat  fm  datan  tot  ad  operAtions  for
comnpnuu.  Jcri*nmt  eatn  that p  nfitbiht  for h  adn  d indury  was nega  in 1975-79.
b. Profits  ae  hasad  on depetion  according  to oat eatiae  in_d  of pla.
o. Much  of thd ina  in prfitbilt  wa  due to the incrased vahlu  of invmreoAs  folowing a shap  inras  in nice  pficcs.
Excludin the  ami  efc  (excpt for Sandvk,  prft  would  hav  bea  about IS par  .
d. fr  aver  for all Swedi mining  an  f  fima. Profility  during 1975-79  was betw  3.8 paat  md 6.8
PMA
Sma:  1  _nkntv  od  Na  _hlic  E  _mdida  (1984.38
Table 4 FrAlablityi  Profit margin  In the  Swedish  staintes  steel Industry  ompared with the
lndustrl  seto  aLage  197S88
(prf  as a po  e of  tal  net sales)
u  y  1W,  iR7W 1Y77  1Y7M IY  IVW  1  ,5  7=  IyU  IyE  1y8  iY  IYUl  1Y
Avestb  0.7  -1.6  -5.9  -2.9  3.8  1.8  -12.4  -7.9  -1.2  1.4 1.1  4.6  6.6  17.1




indust.  . ..  ..  ..  ..  . 3.6  3.3  5.2  6.7  15.3
Inukstrial
sector
averagof  4.8  2.7  -0.4  0  3.2  3.4  1.5  2.9  6.2  6.8  6.1  5.3  6.1  6.7
Notw:  Prfits  incusm  of plamed deprcid  ad  fndial  iwamnehlo  end sulusive of m1.
a. Much  of thdo  kW  im  in profit wa  due to a rie  in invhM  value folowing the sup  inus  in n&d  pries.
b. Data for 19844  a  for bD  _w  Aveat (inchudg Aveft-Sanivik Tubo).
a. Date  for 197583 an  for the  atod  dIidon of the Sandvik  Group;  tho  for 198448 aS for S  k ned, a sup_e
compean.
d. Ngby-Udddw,  a spute  coa  in 1979-83,  ws  abuobed by Aveat in 1984.  Profit eal_laton excludes  fin  l
v. Daft  fiw he Minm  l im  umy cover Avwd  cuding  AvestaSndvlk Tube) and SandvOL  Mm  iu6atys profits  won
sot callaed  for de  pwi  befir  1984  because  dam for Nyhby.ddohWl aWd  few  Avesta/Sandvik  an  nuet  ceparb  and dat
wow unmavaW for FagusWe gaidnss te  dmivon  or for Gungeo.Nyby.
f. Aveag  for all Swedish  mining  on  nu  fu
Sbur=:  Aveta (1975-88),  Sanik  (1975488),  Ny  IyUddeblm  (197940), Uddehlim (1981, 1983),  ad  Naringaln39
Table 5 InventorIes of ftnised  steel product  In Sweden, 1974-79
(year-end,  thousands  of metric  tons)
sector  "  174  197  1970  97  195  17
Steel  producers  579  772  924  762  563  533
Engineering  industry  765  788  784  705  655  639
Steel  wholesalers  291  233  295  240  191  190
Total  1,635  1,793  2,003  1,707  1,409  1,362
Source:  OECD  (1980)40
Table 6 Swedlsb  govfnet  loa1 and credit  guarntees to stan  s ds  liM,  17879
(millions  of U.S. dollars)
Coudhional  fe4ft
flrms  Lowai'  Loan~~~~*  guaranees  iow  tie
Avesta  12  0  27  39  543
Fagorsta  7  0  0  7  ma
Granges-
Nybyd  3  13  11  27  na
Nyby-
Uddeholm  32  79  17  128  349
Sandvik
(Steeldivision)  8  0  0  8  808
Industry
total  62  92  55  209  1700
a  indicts  ta  dat  weo uvailablo.
Nate:  Ronm  (SKr) wer  convetd  to dolla  ate  averag exchango  for 1978-79  (USSI = 4A Skr).
a. Ten-year  loas  at 3.75 pmt  above  the  officil  discu  r  of the Natial  Bk  of Sweden
b.torat  atu  e  a  equal  to that a  industial  s;  _pymat of loas  ss  afte  d  te  fim  bein  to u.k  a psefi  aibwug
igam  is calculated  famm  td  fint day of dh  loaL
c. For Avesa ad  Smik  (sted divion),  cavea  s i  1978  and 1979;  for Nyby-Uddehon, covers  sle  In 1979  only (Its
f5at year of opeation). Di_ggreatd  da  oan  ataasl  saes wen unailable  for FagePt  and Ganges-Nyby.
d. Gages-Nyby  cead  to exis as a Gm in 1979.
c. Incldes Avesta,  Nyby-Uddeholm,  and Seadvis  ee diision
Sourc:  Pdtterson (1988), Govemnmt of Sweden  (1984), Avea  (1978, 1979),  NybylUdeholm (1979),  ad  Sa_it& (1978,
1979).41
Table 7 World sha  of crude  stin  st  producton,  197"9
(percea# e of production  in tons)
Ceby  1974  1975  1976  19f  17  17  19  1981  198  18  194  19  16  18  I19  19M  9
sw@u0a  J  -0  -
Communkty  28  29  30  31  32  31  32  32  33  31  32  31  32  32  33  32
UnitedStates 29  22  24  26  26  26  22  25  18  23  20  19  19  20  19  17
Note: Ecud  poductio  n Euan  Europe,  do Soit  Uion,  and  a.  P_  s srm  of prdtm  in tr,  sin  no
inteionai  rconVarblo  fig=s  an  available  for pra  vra.
a. Pane,  Wee  emany, It*,  Span, and do United  Kiom.
Saue:  low (1981, 1990)
Table  8 World shar  of stainless  steel exports of tubes and finished  and semiflnished  products
(nrenu!  of Mxortu  in tons)
C4w*y  1974  197  1976  1977  1978  19  198  198  1983  1984  1985  1986  17  18  19
Sweden  18  17  13  12  12  11  10  9  9  8  8  7  8  7  7  7
European
Communitya 43  45  36  43  47  49  48  51  52  52  54  56  55  54  52  53
United  States  8  5  4  4  3  3  5  3  2  2  1  2  1  2  2  2
Nae: Excdoing prutwn  na  E  huope, th  Sovi  Umon,  ad  Chi  P  o  mIas  of  ps  an to  m,  ince  o
itenaonly  coQVarabe  fiues  arm  avalb  for prducton  val
a. Fanc,  Wet  Gerany,  Itl.  Spain, md th  United  Kingdom
Sore:  oo (1981, 1990)42
Table  9  port tardffs  for stainless  stel  products  In 1990
(percentages)
European  Unked
Category  Sweden  COumw7  Sttes
Semifinished  products  3.2  3.2  5.2
Finished  producte  5.0  6.0  10.0b
Tubes  7.0  10.0  7.6
Note: For  ndrd  quality  and dimio.  Tariffs may  differ  for monm  spead vaeuies. Tffs  ta  oe
eublied  at the GAIT Tokyo  Round  in 1979.
a. Plat , sheiip,  bar,  rod, and  won.
b. Egimate;  the Unitd State ha  a wide range of triffs.
Soue:  lbllvert  (1990, Euopean Commisson  (1990),  and  _emonal  Trade Comnion  (1990).43
Table 10 U.S. trade renelUes cses  agat  Swedish stainless steld produwe,  197287
Yeawa  7p  of case  Stainss steel  p  c  i  tcomeof  case
1972-73  auiclumping  p  posiive; sil  In iffect
1974-76  section 201  sheet-strip,  plate, bar,  quota (to 19W0)
wire-rod
1975-76  secdon 201  drawn-wire  native
198142  section 301  sheet-strip,  plate, bar,  negative; withdrawn (1983)
wire-rod
1982-83  section 201  sheet-rip,  plate, bar,  addidonal tariff for sheet-strip
wire-rod  and plate; quota for bar and
wire-rod (to 1989)
1985-86  section 301  drawn-wire, tubes  withdrawn by petitioners
1986  secdon 301  drawn-wire, tubes  withdrawn by petitionens
1986  section 301  drawn-wire, tubes  negative
1986-7  countervailing  duty  tUbes  negative
198-7  antldunping  tubes  positive for seamless  bs,
still in effect; negative for
welded tubes
1987-90  anddumping  tubes  positive for welded  tubes; still
in effect
a. From the year the case was inidated to the year the outcome was announced.
Sources:  Amixcan Meta Markt (1990);  Hufbauer,  Berliner,  and Elliott  (1986);  and  Jemkontoret
(1976,  1981-83,  1985-87  and inteviews).PRE  Wo  PaRer  Series
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